When the
Mask Falls: A Critical Islamic Response to Al-Duhayyih's Episode on Rejection
and Violence
Abstract
This article
offers a systematic critique of a widely circulated Arabic-language video
episode by content creator Ahmad Al-Duhayyih, which addressed the relationship
between male rejection and violence through the lens of Western gender
studies—specifically the framework of "toxic masculinity." Drawing on
Quranic exegesis, Prophetic tradition (hadith), and Islamic moral
philosophy, this article argues that the episode's explanatory framework
suffers from significant logical fallacies, ideological selectivity, and a
conspicuous absence of Islamic theological resources. The article further
demonstrates that classical Islamic tradition provides a more epistemologically
coherent, morally robust, and empirically defensible account of masculine
identity, emotional regulation, and the ethics of rejection than the one
offered by the episode under examination. The analysis proceeds across five
dimensions: theological reframing, Prophetic exemplars, logical critique,
ideological deconstruction, and an articulation of the Islamic alternative.
1.
Introduction: A Problem of Framing
In an era of
algorithmically curated content, the line between genuine inquiry and
ideological propagation is increasingly difficult to discern. Arabic-language
digital media, in particular, has witnessed a surge of content that imports
Western theoretical frameworks wholesale into contexts shaped by profoundly
different religious, cultural, and epistemological traditions. Among the most
consequential of these importations is the discourse surrounding "toxic
masculinity"—a concept originating in feminist sociology and gender
studies that has migrated, with remarkable speed and minimal critical
examination, into mainstream Arabic content creation.
Ahmad
Al-Duhayyih's episode on rejection and violence represents a case study in this
phenomenon. The episode is technically accomplished: its editing is precise,
its narrative arc compelling, and its presenter's ability to render academic
research accessible to general audiences is genuinely admirable. Yet technical
virtuosity is not the same as intellectual rigor, and the episode's
sophisticated presentation should not be permitted to obscure the significant
analytical problems that lie beneath its polished surface.¹
The central
contention of this article is threefold. First, the episode's explanatory
framework—which attributes male violence following rejection primarily to
"traditional masculinity" and "fragile manhood"—is
logically untenable, relying on a cascade of well-documented logical fallacies.
Second, the episode's conspicuous omission of Islamic theological resources
constitutes a methodological error of the first order, given that the societies
it implicitly addresses are majority Muslim. Third, and most constructively,
the Islamic tradition offers a conceptually richer, more psychologically
sophisticated, and more practically effective framework for understanding and
preventing the kind of violence the episode rightly condemns.
2. What
the Episode Actually Claims: A Summary and Initial Assessment
The episode
begins with the case of Elliot Rodger, an American perpetrator of mass violence
who killed six people and wounded fourteen others in 2014, having first
published a 137-page manifesto and recorded videos in which he attributed his
violence to rejection by women.² The episode uses this case as the empirical
springboard for a broader argument: that male violence following rejection is
not merely an individual pathological phenomenon but a structural consequence
of "traditional masculinity."
It is
important to acknowledge, before proceeding to critique, what is genuinely
valuable in the episode's intervention. The episode is correct that rejection
does not justify violence. It is correct that emotional repression can have
destructive consequences. It is correct that social norms around masculine
identity can, under certain conditions, contribute to harmful behaviors. These
are not trivial observations, and they deserve serious engagement rather than
wholesale dismissal.
However, the
episode moves from these defensible observations to a much larger and far more
contestable claim: that "traditional masculinity" as such—understood
as an integrated cultural complex—is the primary causal factor in violence
following rejection. This leap is not merely logically unwarranted; it is, as
this article demonstrates, actively misleading.³
3. The
Islamic Theological Response: Reframing the Question of Male Worth
3.1 The
Source of Human Dignity
The
episode's entire analytical architecture rests on an unexamined premise: that a
man's sense of worth is, and perhaps ought to be, substantially derived from
romantic acceptance by women. Within this framework, rejection constitutes a
threat to masculine identity, and violence becomes an intelligible—if
reprehensible—response to that threat.
The Quran
offers a direct and radical refutation of this premise. Surah Al-Hujurat
(49:13) establishes the Islamic criterion for human dignity in terms that could
not be more explicit: *"Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of God
is the most righteous of you."*⁴ The Arabic term akram—rendered
here as "most noble"—denotes not merely ethical superiority but
ontological standing before the Divine. The criterion is taqwa (God-consciousness,
piety, righteousness)—not relational success, social standing, or romantic
achievement.
This Quranic
principle dismantles the foundational premise of the episode's argument before
the argument has even been constructed. If a man's worth before God is
constituted by his piety, then romantic rejection cannot, in any theologically
coherent sense, diminish that worth. The entire edifice of "fragile
manhood" theory—which holds that masculinity is a precarious achievement
that can be lost through social failure—presupposes a conception of masculine
worth that the Quran explicitly rejects.⁵
3.2 The
Locus of Honor
The episode
draws substantially on the research of Jennifer Bosson and colleagues on
"precarious manhood," the thesis that masculine identity is, unlike
feminine identity, a social achievement that must be constantly demonstrated
and defended, and that perceived threats to this achievement activate
aggressive "manhood-restoring" behaviors.⁶ This theoretical framework
may have descriptive validity within certain cultural contexts. What it cannot
claim, however, is normative universality.
The Quran's
response to the question of where honor resides is unambiguous. Surah Fatir
(35:10) declares: *"Whoever desires honor—then to God belongs all
honor."*⁷ The implication is clear: the man who seeks honor by
demonstrating dominance, sexual conquest, or social validation is not merely
engaging in a psychologically precarious enterprise; he is, theologically
speaking, seeking honor from the wrong source. The Islamic tradition does not
ask men to perform masculinity for a social audience. It asks them to cultivate
righteousness before God—an entirely different relational orientation with
entirely different psychological consequences.
3.3
Emotions, Expression, and Islamic Psychology
One of the
episode's more genuinely insightful observations concerns the relationship
between emotional repression and violence. Drawing on neuroscientific research
showing that social rejection activates the same neural pathways as physical
pain,⁸ the episode argues that men socialized to suppress emotional expression
are left with no outlet for their pain except aggression. This is a serious and
well-documented concern.
The
episode's implicit assumption, however, is that "traditional"
cultures—and Islamic culture in particular, though it is never
named—systematically require emotional repression in men. This assumption is
empirically false and theologically uninformed.
The Quran's
account of the Prophet Jacob (Ya'qub) after the loss of his son Joseph is one
of the most psychologically rich passages in the entire text: *"And his
eyes turned white from grief, and he was a suppressor [of his anguish]."*⁹
The verse records not the suppression but the physical manifestation of
grief—eyes whitened by weeping. The Quran does not present this as a failure of
masculine composure; it preserves it as a moment of profound human dignity.
The Prophet
Muhammad (peace be upon him) wept openly at the death of his infant son
Ibrahim. His reported words—"The eye weeps, the heart grieves, and we say
nothing except what pleases our Lord"¹⁰—constitute a precise articulation
of the Islamic position on emotion and expression: feeling is permitted, indeed
expected; what is regulated is action. The Islamic tradition does not demand
that men not feel; it demands that men not act destructively on what they feel.
This
distinction—between the regulation of emotion and the regulation of action—is
the distinction the episode entirely misses. The hadith of the Prophet,
"The strong man is not the one who can wrestle people to the ground, but
the one who controls himself in anger,"¹¹ does not prescribe emotional
suppression; it prescribes self-mastery over destructive action. These are
categorically different things.
4.
Prophetic Exemplars: The Seerah as Empirical Refutation
If the
episode's thesis were correct—that traditional masculine norms generate
violence in response to rejection—then we would expect to find evidence of this
pattern in the foundational period of Islamic civilization, which was, by any
measure, a deeply traditional masculine culture. What we find instead is the
opposite.
4.1 The
Case of the Woman Who Sought Refuge
Among the
most striking accounts in Sahih Al-Bukhari is that of a woman whom the Prophet
married and who, upon his entering upon her, said: *"I seek refuge in God
from you."*¹² The Prophet's response—"You have sought refuge in One
who is great; rejoin your family"—is remarkable in its equanimity. By the
logic of "fragile manhood," this public rejection by his own bride
should have constituted a severe threat to masculine honor requiring aggressive
restoration. The Prophet instead responded with quiet dignity and immediate
respect for her expressed wish. The account is preserved in canonical hadith
not as an embarrassment to be explained away but as a model of conduct.
4.2 The
Verse of Choice (Aya Al-Takhyir)
When the
Prophet's wives collectively pressed for increased material provision, his
response was not aggression or punitive action but a period of voluntary
seclusion followed by the revelation of Surah Al-Ahzab (33:28-29), which
offered his wives the explicit choice between the worldly life and its
adornments, or God and His Messenger.¹³ The Arabic phrase sarahan
jamila—"a beautiful farewell"—is notable: even the possibility of
separation is framed in terms of dignity and grace. This is not the discourse
of dominance; it is the discourse of honor through the honoring of others'
freedom.
4.3 Zayd
ibn Haritha and Legitimate Dissolution
The case of
Zayd ibn Haritha, who divorced his wife Zaynab bint Jahsh without recourse to
violence or public humiliation, illustrates that the first generation of
Muslims understood marital dissolution as a legitimate and dignified option
rather than a trigger for masculine crisis.¹⁴ Zayd's action, and his continued
intimacy with the Prophet following it, demonstrates a conception of masculine
honor entirely decoupled from relational possession.
4.4 The
Institution of Khul' (Wife-Initiated Divorce)
The legal
institutionalization of khul'—the woman's right to dissolve a
marriage by returning the marriage gift—from the earliest period of Islamic
jurisprudence represents a structural acknowledgment of women's autonomy in
marital choice.¹⁵ The Prophet's words in the case of the wife of Thabit ibn
Qays—"Do you return his garden? ... Take the garden and divorce her
once"¹⁶—formalize this right within a framework that does not treat the
husband's honor as contingent on his wife's inability to leave. A civilization
that institutionalizes women's right to exit cannot coherently be characterized
as generating masculine identity through the control of women.
5. The
Logical Fallacies: A Systematic Critique
Setting
aside the theological dimension and examining the episode purely on its own
terms—as a work of social analysis—reveals a pattern of logical errors that
would be considered disqualifying in academic peer review. The following
section identifies the most significant.
5.1
Oversimplification (Single-Cause Fallacy)
The episode
attributes a complex, multi-determined phenomenon—violence following
rejection—to a single explanatory variable: traditional masculinity. This is
logically untenable. Elliot Rodger had documented psychiatric histories from
age nine, was receiving ongoing professional psychological treatment, had
profound social isolation, extensive exposure to online misogynist communities,
and demonstrated symptoms consistent with narcissistic personality disorder.¹⁷
The reduction of this complex etiological picture to "toxic
masculinity" constitutes a textbook case of oversimplification, or what
logicians term the "fallacy of the single cause."
5.2 Hasty
Generalization
The episode
moves from one extreme case—a documented psychiatric patient who committed mass
murder—to generalizations about the masculine socialization of men as a
category. By any standard of epidemiological reasoning, this inference is
invalid. If traditional masculinity were a reliable causal predictor of
post-rejection violence, the overwhelming majority of men who experience
rejection—a universal human experience—would demonstrate violent responses.
They do not. The 99.9% of men who experience rejection without resorting to
violence constitutes empirical evidence that demands explanation on the
episode's terms. It receives none.¹⁸
5.3
Cherry-Picking (Confirmation Bias)
The episode
selectively presents studies that support its thesis while ignoring a
substantial body of research that complicates it. Research on intimate partner
violence, for example, consistently shows that women also perpetrate violence
in relationships, particularly psychological and coercive violence.¹⁹ Research
on male mental health shows that men are significantly more likely to die by
suicide following relationship dissolution.²⁰ The episode's silence on these
findings is not merely an omission; it constitutes a methodological distortion.
5.4
Conflation of Correlation and Causation
The studies
the episode cites establish, at best, correlational relationships between
certain masculine norms and certain behavioral outcomes. The Bosson research on
"precarious manhood," for instance, measures psychological responses
in laboratory settings under artificially constructed conditions.²¹ The
inference from these correlational findings to causal claims about real-world
violence involves a logical step the episode does not justify and that the
original researchers themselves do not make.
5.5 Straw
Man
The
"traditional masculinity" that the episode attacks is a caricature:
emotionally repressive, dominance-oriented, contemptuous of women, and
violence-prone. This description does not correspond to the normative
conception of masculinity in classical Islamic civilization, nor to many other
traditional masculine cultures, nor indeed to the lived experience of most
traditionally masculine men. The episode attacks a construction of its own
making.²²
5.6 False
Dichotomy
The episode
presents the viewer with two options: traditional masculinity (violent,
repressive, harmful) or a new emotional expressiveness (therapeutic,
progressive, safe). The Islamic model of masculinity—oriented around taqwa, sabr (patience), kithm
al-ghaydh (anger control), rahma (mercy), and 'adl (justice)—does
not appear in this binary. The absence is not incidental; it is necessary to
the episode's rhetorical structure. A third option that is both traditional and
demonstrably non-violent would refute the episode's central premise.
5.7
Shifting Moral Responsibility
The
episode's claim that "no one just becomes a monster—society creates
them" represents a consequential displacement of moral agency.²³ The Quran
is unequivocal on this point: "No bearer of burdens shall bear the
burden of another" (6:164),²⁴ and "Every soul is
held in pledge for what it has earned" (52:21).²⁵ The Islamic
tradition does not deny the influence of environment, socialization, or social
structure on human behavior. What it insists upon is that these influences do
not abrogate individual moral responsibility. The killer kills. The killer is
responsible. The displacement of responsibility onto "society" or
"traditional masculinity" functions, however unintentionally, as a
partial exculpation of the perpetrator.
5.8
Science Washing
The episode
invokes the authority of scientific research without subjecting that research
to critical scrutiny. Sample sizes, methodological limitations, cultural
specificity, and replication failures are not discussed. The Bosson studies on
hair-braiding, for instance—which the episode appears to reference—involve
small laboratory samples under highly artificial conditions and cannot sustain
the broad cultural inferences the episode draws from them.²⁶ The selective
citation of research findings without methodological evaluation is a form of
rhetorical appeal to authority rather than genuine scientific reasoning.
6. The
Ideological Architecture: What the Episode Does Not Say
A
sophisticated critique must attend not only to what a text argues but to what
it systematically excludes. The episode's omissions are as revealing as its
inclusions.
The
absence of religion is
the most striking. In episodes addressing masculine behavior in societies that
are predominantly Muslim, the Islamic tradition is mentioned precisely zero
times—not as a contributing factor, not as a potential resource, not as a
contextual consideration. This is not an oversight; it is a methodological
choice with ideological consequences. The pretense that one can offer a
comprehensive account of male socialization in Muslim-majority societies
without reference to Islam is itself an ideological position masquerading as
scholarly neutrality.²⁷
The
absence of alternative causal factors is equally significant. The research literature on male
violence identifies a substantial number of contributing variables that the
episode does not address: pornography consumption and its effects on relational
expectations,²⁸ family dissolution and the effects of absent fathers on male
development,²⁹ substance abuse,³⁰ online radicalization through incel
communities,³¹ and the general crisis of meaning and identity in secularized
societies.³² The episode's focus on "traditional masculinity" as the
master variable requires the systematic suppression of these alternative
explanations.
The
absence of countervailing evidence regarding female violence, male victimization, and the
complexity of gender dynamics in intimate relationships has already been noted.
Its effect is to present a fundamentally unipolar account of gender and
violence that cannot survive contact with the full empirical literature.
The
cumulative effect of these omissions is to transform what presents itself as
empirical social analysis into what is, in fact, ideological advocacy for a
specific theoretical framework—the framework of gender studies and feminist
sociology—dressed in the rhetoric of scientific objectivity.
7. The
Islamic Alternative: A Comprehensive Framework
Having
subjected the episode's framework to sustained critique, this article now turns
to its constructive task: articulating what the Islamic tradition actually
offers as a response to the problem of male violence following rejection.
The Islamic
response is not a single intervention but an integrated pedagogical and
spiritual system that addresses the problem at multiple levels simultaneously.
At the
level of identity,
the Islamic tradition roots masculine worth in taqwa rather
than social performance. A man who has internalized this criterion does not
experience romantic rejection as an existential threat, because his existential
worth is not constituted by romantic success. The famous Quranic
injunction, "And perhaps you hate a thing and it is good for
you" (2:216),³³ provides a theological framework within which
rejection can be understood as potentially providential rather than
catastrophic.
At the
level of emotion,
the Islamic tradition distinguishes sharply between feeling and action. The
normative models of the Prophet and his Companions demonstrate emotional
expressiveness—weeping, grief, longing—combined with disciplined restraint in
action. This is not emotional repression; it is emotional maturity. The hadith
tradition provides extensive guidance on the management of anger (ghaydh),
consistently distinguishing between the emotion (natural, expected) and
destructive action upon it (prohibited, culpable).³⁴
At the
level of relationship,
the Islamic tradition conceives of marriage not as a masculine entitlement or a
proof of masculine worth but as a mercy and a covenant (mithaq ghaliz).
The Quranic characterization of marriage in terms of sakina (tranquility), mawadda (loving
affection), and rahma (mercy) (30:21)³⁵ is fundamentally
incompatible with the conception of women as objects whose acceptance or
rejection determines masculine identity.
At the
level of legal structure, the institutionalization of women's right to refuse marriage (wali's role
notwithstanding), to seek divorce through khul', and to be treated
with dignified courtesy even in marital dissolution creates a legal
architecture that is structurally incompatible with the "ownership"
model of gender relations that produces violence.
At the
level of spiritual practice, the Islamic devotional system—prayer, supplication, fasting,
recitation—provides men with resources for the processing of negative emotion
that are not available within the purely therapeutic framework the episode
recommends. The directive "Seek help through patience and
prayer" (2:45)³⁶ is not a pious platitude; it is a prescription
for the channeling of psychic energy toward constructive rather than
destructive ends.
This
integrated framework is not offered as a replacement for psychological support,
mental health resources, or community care. It is offered as the foundational
architecture within which such supports can function most effectively—as, in
the language of preventive medicine, the immunological system that reduces the
incidence of the pathology before clinical intervention becomes necessary.
8.
Conclusion
This article
has argued that Al-Duhayyih's episode on rejection and violence, while
technically accomplished and animated by genuine concern about a serious social
problem, fails on multiple analytical levels. Its explanatory framework is
logically deficient, relying on a cascade of well-documented fallacies. Its
empirical base is selectively deployed in ways that systematically suppress
contrary evidence. Its ideological architecture reflects a specific theoretical
tradition—Western feminist gender studies—that it presents as universal
scientific consensus. And its conspicuous omission of Islamic theological
resources renders it, as social analysis of Muslim societies, fundamentally
incomplete.
The Islamic
tradition, by contrast, offers a conception of masculine identity that is
intrinsically resistant to the pathology the episode describes. When masculine
worth is constituted by taqwa rather than by social
performance or romantic success, rejection cannot destabilize masculine
identity, because masculine identity was never constituted by romantic
acceptance in the first place. When the normative models of masculinity are the
Prophet who quietly released the woman who sought refuge from him, the
companion who divorced without violence, and the man who controlled his anger
as an act of spiritual strength, the pathway from rejection to violence is
blocked not by external intervention after the fact but by the formation of
character before the fact.
The Quranic
verse with which this analysis opened is also its conclusion: *"Indeed,
the most noble of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of
you."*³⁷ In those ten Arabic words lies a complete anthropology, a
complete ethics, and a complete response to the question of what it means to be
a man in the face of rejection.
Notes
1. For a general discussion of the challenges of science communication in Arabic digital media, see Tarek Osman, Arab Modernities: Islamism, Nationalism, and Liberalism in the Post-Arab Spring Era (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 112–34.
2. Elliot Rodger, "My Twisted World: The Story of Elliot Rodger," manifesto, May 2014. For scholarly analysis, see Scott Bonn, "Why Mass Shooters Are Almost Always Men," Psychology Today, June 13, 2014.
3. For a critique of reductive explanatory frameworks in media analysis of violence, see Richard Rosenfeld, "The Big Picture: 2005 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology," Criminology 44, no. 1 (2006): 1–26.
4. Quran 49:13. All Quranic translations in this article are adapted from Saheeh International, The Quran: Arabic Text with Corresponding English Meanings (Riyadh: Al-Muntada Al-Islami, 1997).
5. For an extended theological analysis of taqwa and human dignity in Islamic thought, see Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur'an (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), 17–36.
6. Jennifer K. Bosson and Joseph A. Vandello, "Precarious Manhood and Its Links to Action and Aggression," Current Directions in Psychological Science 20, no. 2 (2011): 82–86.
7. Quran 35:10.
8. Naomi I. Eisenberger, Matthew D. Lieberman, and Kipling D. Williams, "Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion," Science 302, no. 5643 (2003): 290–92.
9. Quran 12:84.
10. Al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, trans. Muhammad Muhsin Khan (Riyadh: Dar-us-Salam, 1997), vol. 2, hadith no. 1303.
11. Al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, vol. 8, hadith no. 6114.
12. Al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, vol. 7, hadith no. 5254. See also Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifa, 1379 AH), 9:353.
13. Quran 33:28–29. For commentary, see Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur'an al-'Azim (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1998), 6:385–90.
14. Ibn Hisham, Al-Sira al-Nabawiyya, ed. Mustafa Al-Saqqa et al. (Cairo: Mustafa Al-Babi Al-Halabi, 1955), 3:339–46.
15. For the jurisprudential development of khul', see Noel Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), 14–21.
16. Al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, vol. 7, hadith no. 5273.
17. Peter Langman, "Elliot Rodger: Background and Analysis," SchoolShooters.info, 2014, https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/rodger_analysis_1.1.pdf.
18. For base rate analysis in violence prediction, see John Monahan, "The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence," in Science in the Law: Social and Behavioral Science Issues, ed. David Faigman et al. (St. Paul: West Group, 2002), 423–45.
19. Martin S. Fiebert, "References Examining Assaults by Women on Their Spouses or Male Partners: An Updated Annotated Bibliography," Sexuality and Culture 18, no. 2 (2014): 405–67.
20. Matthew K. Nock et al., "Cross-National Prevalence and Risk Factors for Suicidal Ideation, Plans, and Attempts," British Journal of Psychiatry 192, no. 2 (2008): 98–105.
21. Bosson and Vandello, "Precarious Manhood," 82–86.
22. For the methodological critique of straw man constructions in gender studies discourse, see Christina Hoff Sommers, Who Stole Feminism? How Women Have Betrayed Women (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 40–72.
23. This formulation paraphrases a claim made in the episode under analysis.
24. Quran 6:164.
25. Quran 52:21.
26. Bosson and Vandello, "Precarious Manhood," 84. The authors themselves acknowledge significant limitations in the generalizability of their laboratory findings.
27. For the critique of secular methodological assumptions in the study of Muslim societies, see Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 1–17.
28. Gail Dines, Pornland: How Porn Has Hijacked Our Sexuality (Boston: Beacon Press, 2010), 45–89.
29. David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social Problem (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 25–48.
30. Robert D. Putnam, Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 112–40.
31. J. M. Berger, "The Angry Fringe," The Atlantic, June 2, 2018.
32. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 299–321.
33. Quran 2:216.
34. For an extended analysis of anger management in Islamic ethical literature, see Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn (Cairo: Dār al-Sha'b, 1903), 3:157–78. For an accessible English treatment, see Winter, T. J., trans., Al-Ghazali on Disciplining the Soul and Breaking the Two Desires (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1995).
35. Quran 30:21.
36. Quran 2:45.
37. Quran 49:13.